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Abstract— When heterogeneous congestion control protocols
that react to different pricing signals share the same network,
the resulting equilibrium may no longer be interpreted as a
solution to the standard utility maximization problem. We prove
the existence of equilibrium in general multi-protocol networks
under mild assumptions. For almost all networks, the equilibria
are locally unique, and finite and odd in number. They cannot all
be locally stable unless it is globally unique. Finally, we show that
if the price mapping functions that map link prices to effective
prices observed by the sources are similar, then global uniqueness
is guaranteed. Numerical examples are used throughout the paper
to illustrate these results.
Index Terms— Congestion control, Heterogeneous protocols,
Multiprotocol networks, Equilibrium analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Congestion control protocols have been modeled as dis-
tributed algorithms for network utility maximization, e.g., [10],
[14], [22], [33], [11], [13]. With the exception of a few
limited analysis on very simple topologies [21], [12], [13],
[8], existing literature generally assumes that all sources are
homogeneous in that, even though they may control their rates
using different algorithms, they all adapt to the same type of
congestion signals, e.g., all react to loss probabilities, as in
TCP Reno, or all to queueing delay, as in TCP Vegas or FAST
[9]. When sources with heterogeneous protocols that react
to different congestion signals share the same network, the
current duality framework is no longer applicable. With more
congestion control protocols being proposed and ideas of using
congestion signals other than packet losses, including explicit
feedbacks, being developed in the networking community, we
need a mathematically rigorous framework to understand the
behavior of large-scale networks with heterogeneous protocols.
The purpose of this paper is to propose such a framework.
Our emphasis is on general networks with multiple sources
and links that use a large class of algorithms to adapt their
rates and congestion prices. Often, interesting and counter-
intuitive behaviors arise only in a network setting where
sources interact through shared links in intricate and surprising
ways, e.g., [30]. Such behaviors are absent in single-link
models and are usually hard to discover or explain without a
fundamental understanding of the underlying structure. Given
Partial and preliminary results have appeared in
[31].
the scale and heterogeneity of the Internet, it is conceivable
that such behaviors are more common than we realize, but
remain difficult to measure due to the complexity of the
infrastructure and our inability to monitor it closely. A math-
ematical framework thus becomes indispensable in exploring
structures, clarifying ideas, and suggesting directions. Some
of the theoretical predictions in this paper have already been
demonstrated experimentally in [29].
B. Summary
A congestion control protocol generally takes the form
p˙l = gl
 ∑
j:l∈L(j)
xj(t), pl(t)
 (1)
x˙j = fj
xj(t), ∑
l∈L(j)
mjl (pl(t))
 (2)
Here, L(j) denotes the set of links used by source j, and
gl(·) models a queue management algorithm that updates the
price pl(t) at link l, often implicitly, based on its current value
and the sum of source rates xj(t) that traverse link l. The
prices may represent loss probabilities, queueing delays, or
quantities explicitly calculated by the links and fed back to
the sources. The function fj models a TCP algorithm that
adjusts the transmission rate xj(t) of source j based on its
current value and the sum of “effective prices” mjl (pl(t)) in
its path. The effective prices mjl (pl(t)) are functions of the
link prices pl(t), and the functions mjl in general can depend
on the links and sources.
When all algorithms use the same pricing signal, i.e., mjl =
ml are the same for all sources j, the equilibrium properties
of (1)–(2) turn out to be very simple. Indeed, under mild
conditions on gl and fj , the equilibrium of (1)–(2) exists and
is unique [13]. This is proved by identifying the equilibrium
of (1)–(2) with the unique solution of the utility maximization
problem defined in [10] and its Lagrange dual problem [14].
Here, the equilibrium prices pl play the role of Lagrange mul-
tipliers, one at each link. This utility maximization problem
thus provides a simple and complete characterization of the
equilibrium of a single-protocol network and also leads to a
relatively simple dynamic behavior.
When heterogeneous algorithms that use different pricing
signals share the same network, i.e., mjl are different for
2different sources j, the situation is much more complicated.
For instance, when TCP Reno and TCP Vegas or FAST share
the same network, neither loss probability nor queueing delay
can serve as the Lagrange multiplier at the link, and (1)–(2)
can no longer be interpreted as solving the standard network
utility maximization problem. Basic questions, such as the
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, its local and global
stability, need to be re-examined.
We focus in this paper on the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium. We prove that equilibrium still exists, under
mild conditions, despite the lack of an underlying concave
optimization problem (Section III). In contrast to the single-
protocol case, even when the routing matrix has full row
rank, there can be uncountably many equilibria (Example 1 in
Section IV) and the set of bottleneck links can be non-unique
(Example 2 in Section IV). However, we prove that almost all
networks have finitely many equilibria and they are necessarily
locally unique (Section IV). We prove the number of equilibria
is always odd, though can be more than one (Section IV).
Moreover, these equilibria cannot all be locally stable unless
the equilibrium is globally unique (Section IV). Finally, we
provide two sufficient conditions for global uniqueness of
network equilibrium (Sections VI and V). The first condition
implies that if the price mapping functions that map link
prices to effective prices observed by the sources do not
differ too much, then global uniqueness is guaranteed. The
second condition generalizes the full-rank condition on routing
matrix for global uniqueness from single-protocol networks
to multi-protocol networks. Throughout the paper, we provide
numerical examples to illustrate equilibrium properties or how
a theorem can be applied. In [29], we demonstrate experi-
mentally the phenomenon of multiple equilibria using TCP
Reno and TCP Vegas/FAST in ns-2 simulator and Dummynet
testbed.
C. Related work
Our formulation is close to the general equilibrium theory
in economics from which we borrow ideas and techniques
[18]. See [4], [6], [7], [24], [25], [32], [3], [5] and [17], [1]
for a fairly complete treatment of related works in economics
literature. A typical model of the pure exchange economy
consists of L commodities and N consumers. Each consumer
i has an initial endowment vector ωi = (ωil ≥ 0, l =
1, . . . , L) and its goal is to choose a consumption vector
xi = (xil, l = 1, . . . , L) to maximize its utility subject to
its wealth constraint, i.e.,
max
xi≥0
Ui(xi) subject to pTxi ≤ pTωi
where p = (pl, l = 1, . . . , L) are unit prices for the goods
and T denotes matrix transpose. For each good l = 1, · · · , L,
demand and supply are balanced if
N∑
i=1
xil =
N∑
i=1
ωil
A consumption vector x∗ = (x∗i , i = 1, . . . , N) and a price
vector p∗ are called a competitive equilibrium (or Walrasian
equilibrium) if x∗i maximizes i’s utility and demand equals
supply for all goods.
In general equilibrium theory, consumers are assumed to
be price takers. This aspect is similar to our model where
sources do not take into account how their decisions affect
the link prices or each other. Both problems are concerned
with characterizing fixed points of a continuous mapping,
and hence there are considerably similarities in terms of the
characterizations and the mathematical tools to derive them.
The main mathematical tools used in this paper are the Nash
theorem in game theory [23], [2], which is an application
of Kakutani’s generalized fixed point theorem, and results
from differential topology, especially the Poincare-Hopf Index
Theorem [20]. They are used to prove existence and study
uniqueness of network equilibrium, respectively. There are
however several differences.
First, the effective prices to different sources (consumers)
are generally different in our model, whereas the prices in the
economic model are independent of consumers. Differential
pricing is what makes networks with heterogeneous proto-
cols much more difficult. Second, in the economic model,
there is a concept of initial endowment that defines both
the demand-supply relation and a consumer’s consumption
possibility through the wealth constraint. In our model, the
wealth constraint is replaced by the link capacity constraint.
Third, in the economic model, consumers maximize their
utilities whereas in our model, sources maximize their utilities
minus bandwidth costs. Finally, in our model, every source
consumes exactly the same amount of bandwidth at each link
in its path (xil = xi, for all l ∈ L(i)), whereas, in the
economic model, consumers can consume different goods at
different amounts. This guarantees that the demand for every
good is exactly balanced by its supply in a pure exchange
economy, yet in networks, the set of bottleneck links where
demand for and supply of bandwidth is balanced can be non-
unique and a strict subset of all links. The property xil = xi is
the key structure that allows us to obtain interesting results on
global uniqueness in fairly general settings. In contrast, global
uniqueness in general equilibrium analysis usually requires
very strong conditions and most literature focuses on local
uniqueness [3], [5], [1].
II. MODEL
A. Notation
A network consists of a set of L links, indexed by l =
1, . . . , L, with finite capacities cl. We often abuse notation
and use L to denote both the number of links and the set
L = {1, . . . , L} of links. Each link has a price pl as its
congestion measure. There are J different protocols indexed
by superscript j, and N j sources using protocol j, indexed
by (j, i) where j = 1, . . . , J and i = 1, . . . , N j . The total
number of sources is N :=
∑
j N
j
.
The L×N j routing matrix Rj for type j sources is defined
by Rjli = 1 if source (j, i) uses link l, and 0 otherwise. The
overall routing matrix is denoted by
R =
[
R1 R2 · · · RJ ]
3Every link l has a price pl. A type j source reacts to the
”effective price” mjl (pl) in its path, where m
j
l is a price
mapping function, which can depend on both the link and
the protocol type. By specifying function mjl , we can let
the link feed back different congestion signals to sources
using different protocols, for example, Reno with packet losses
and Vegas with queueing delay. Let mj(p) = (mjl (pl), l =
1, . . . L) and m(p) = (mj(pl), j = 1, . . . J).
The aggregate prices for source (j, i) is defined as
qji =
∑
l
Rjlim
j
l (pl) (3)
Let qj = (qji , i = 1, . . . , N j) and q = (qj , j = 1 . . . , J)
be vectors of aggregate prices. Then qj =
(
Rj
)T
mj(p) and
q = RTm(p).
Let xj be a vector with the rate xji of source (j, i) as its
ith entry, and x be the vector of xj
x =
[
(x1)T , (x2)T , . . . , (xJ)T
]T
Source (j, i) has a utility function U ji (x
j
i ) that is strictly con-
cave increasing in its rate xji . Let U = (U
j
i , i = 1, . . . , N
j , j =
1, . . . , J).
In general, if zk is defined, then z denotes the (column)
vector z = (zk, ∀k). Other notations will be introduced later
when they are encountered. We call (c,m,R,U) a network.
B. Network equilibrium
A network is in equilibrium, or the link prices p and
source rates x are in equilibrium, when each source (j, i)
maximizes its net benefit (utility minus bandwidth cost), and
the demand for and supply of bandwidth at each bottleneck
link are balanced. Formally, a network equilibrium is defined
as follows.
Given any prices p, we assume in this paper that the source
rates xji are uniquely determined by
xji
(
qji
)
=
[(
U ji
)′−1 (
qji
)]+
where
(
U ji
)′
is the derivative of U ji , and
(
U ji
)′−1
is its
inverse which exists since U ji is strictly concave. Here [z]+ =
max{z, 0}. This implies that the source rates xji uniquely solve
max
z≥0
U ji (z)− zqji
As we will see, under the assumptions in this paper,(
U ji
)′−1 (
qji
)
> 0 for all the prices p that we consider, and
hence we can ignore the projection [·]+ and assume without
loss of generality that
xji
(
qji
)
=
(
U ji
)′−1 (
qji
)
(4)
As usual, we use xj
(
qj
)
=
(
xji
(
qji
)
, i = 1, . . . , N j
)
and
x(q) =
(
xj
(
qj
)
, j = 1, . . . , J
)
to denote the vector-valued
functions composed of xji . Since q = RTm(p), we often abuse
notation and write xji (p), xj(p), x(p).1
Define the aggregate source rates y(p) = (yl(p), l =
1, . . . , L) at links l as:
yj(p) = Rjxj(p), y(p) = Rx(p) (5)
In equilibrium, the aggregate rate at each link is no more
than the link capacity, and they are equal if the link price is
strictly positive. Formally, we call p an equilibrium price, a
network equilibrium, or just an equilibrium if it satisfies (from
(3)–(5))
P (y(p)− c) = 0, y(p) ≤ c, p ≥ 0 (6)
where P := diag(pl) is a diagonal matrix. The goal of this
paper is to study the existence and uniqueness properties
of network equilibrium specified by (3)–(6). Let E be the
equilibrium set:
E = {p ∈ <L+| P (y(p)− c) = 0, y(p) ≤ c} (7)
For future use, we now define an active constraint set and
the Jacobian for links that are actively constrained. Fix an
equilibrium price p∗ ∈ E. Let the active constraint set Lˆ =
Lˆ(p∗) ⊆ L (with respect to p∗) be the set of links l at which
p∗l > 0. Consider the reduced system that consists only of links
in Lˆ, and denote all variables in the reduced system by cˆ, pˆ, yˆ,
etc. Then, since yl(p) = cl for every l ∈ Lˆ, we have yˆ(pˆ) = cˆ.
Let the Jacobian for the reduced system be Jˆ(pˆ) = ∂yˆ(pˆ)/∂pˆ.
Then
Jˆ(pˆ) =
∑
j
Rˆj
∂xj
∂qˆj
(pˆ)
(
Rˆj
)T ∂mˆj
∂pˆ
(pˆ) (8)
where
∂xj
∂qˆj
= diag
( ∂2U ji
∂(xji )2
)−1 (9)
∂mˆj
∂pˆ
= diag
(
∂mˆjl
∂pˆl
)
(10)
and all the partial derivatives are evaluated at the generic point
pˆ.
C. Current theory: J = 1
In this subsection, we briefly review the current theory
for the case where there is only one protocol, i.e., J = 1,
and explain why it cannot be directly applied to the case of
heterogeneous protocols.
When all sources react to the same price, then the equi-
librium described by (3)–(6) is the unique solution of the
following utility maximization problem defined in [10] and
its Lagrange dual [14]:
max
x≥0
∑
i
Ui(xi) (11)
subject to Rx ≤ c (12)
1Hence we can effectively modify user utility functions and influence rate
allocations through the choice of price mapping functions mjl . In particular,
linear link-independent mjl scale user utility functions linearly; see Theorem
16.
4where we have omitted the superscript j = 1. The strict
concavity of Ui guarantees the existence and uniqueness of
the optimal solution of (11)–(12). The basic idea to relate
the utility maximization problem (11)–(12) to the equilibrium
equations (3)–(6) is to examine the dual of the utility max-
imization problem, and interpret the effective price ml(pl)
as a Lagrange multiplier associated with each link capacity
constraint (see, e.g., [14], [22], [13]). As long as ml(pl) ≥ 0
and ml(0) = 0, one can replace pl in (6) by ml(pl). The
resulting equation together with (3)–(5) provides the necessary
and sufficient condition for xi(p) and ml(pl) to be primal and
dual optimal respectively.
This approach breaks down when there are J > 1 types
of prices because there cannot be more than one Lagrange
multiplier at each link. In general, an equilibrium no longer
maximizes aggregate utility, nor is it unique. However, as
shown in the next section, existence of equilibrium is still
guaranteed under the following assumptions:
A1: Utility functions U ji are strictly concave increasing, and
twice continuously differentiable in their domains. Price
mapping functions mjl are continuously differentiable in
their domains and strictly increasing with mjl (0) = 0.
A2: For any ² > 0, there exists a number pmax such that if
pl > pmax for link l, then
xji (p) < ² for all (j, i) with R
j
li = 1
These are mild assumptions. Concavity and monotonicity of
utility functions are often assumed in network pricing for
elastic traffic. The assumption on mjl preserves the relative
order of prices and maps zero price to zero effective price.
Assumption A2 says that when pl is high enough, then every
source going through link l has a rate less than ².
III. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
In this section, we prove the existence of network equi-
librium. We start with a lemma that bounds the equilibrium
prices.
Lemma 1. Suppose A1 and A2 hold. Given a network
(c,m,R,U), there is a scalar pmax that upper bounds any
equilibrium price p, i.e., pl ≤ pmax for all l.
Proof. Choose ² = minl cl/N , and let pmax be the corre-
sponding scalar in A2. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
price p and a link l, such that pl > pmax. A2 implies that the
aggregate equilibrium rate at link l satisfies∑
j
∑
i
Rjlix
j
i (p) < N² = min
l
cl
Therefore, we get a link with pl > 0 but not fully utilized. It
contradicts the equilibrium condition (6).
The following theorem asserts the existence of equilibrium
for a multi-protocol network.
Theorem 2. Suppose A1 and A2 hold. There exists an equi-
librium price p∗ for any network (c,m,R,U).
Proof. Let pmax be the scalar upper bound in Lemma 1. For
any p ∈ [0, pmax]L, define a vector function
F (p) := Rx(p)− c (13)
For any link l, let
p−l := (p1, ...., pl−1, pl+1...pL)T
Then we may write F (p) as F (pl, p−l). Define function hl
as
hl(pl, p−l) := −F 2l (pl, p−l) (14)
We claim that hl(pl, p−l) is a quasi-concave function in pl for
any fixed p−l. By the definition of quasi-concavity in [23], we
only need to check that the set
Al := { pl | hl(pl, p−l) ≥ a }
is convex for all a ∈ <. If a > 0, clearly Al = ∅ by (14).
When a ≤ 0, the set Al can be rewritten as
Al =
{
pl
∣∣∣ −√|a| ≤ Fl(pl, p−l) ≤√|a|}
Since Fl(pl, p−l) is a non-increasing function in pl for any
fixed p−l, the set Al is convex. Therefore hl(pl, p−l) is quasi-
concave in pl.
Since [0, pmax] is a nonempty compact convex set, by
the theorem of Nash [23], the quasi-concavity of hl(pl, p−l)
guarantees that there exists a p∗ ∈ [0, pmax]L such that for all
l ∈ {1, 2...L}
p∗l = arg max
pl∈[0,pmax]
hl(pl, p∗−l)
We now argue that, for all l, either 1) Fl(p∗) = 0, or 2)
Fl(p∗) < 0 and we can take p∗l = 0. These conditions imply
(6), and hence p∗ is an equilibrium price.
Case 1: Fl(0, p∗−l) > 0. Since U
j
i is strictly concave,
Fl(pl, p∗−l) is non-increasing2 in [0, pmax]. Moreover, the proof
of Lemma 1 shows that Fl(pmax, p∗−l) < 0. Therefore, there
exists a point p∗l in [0, pmax] where Fl(pl, p∗−l) = 0. This p∗l
maximizes hl(pl, p∗−l).
Case 2: Fl(0, p∗−l) ≤ 0. Since Fl(pl, p∗−l) is a non-increasing
function in pl, we have that
Fl(pl, p∗−l) ≤ 0 for all pl ∈ [0, pmax]
If −cl < Fl(0, p∗−l) ≤ 0, then Fl(pl, p∗−l) and hl(pl, p∗−l) are
strictly decreasing in pl and hence
p∗l = arg max
pl∈[0,pmax]
hl(pl, p∗−l) = 0
Otherwise we have Fl(0, p∗−l) = −cl from (13). In this
situation, all xji going through link l are zero, and hence
we can set p∗l = 0 without affecting any other prices. More
precisely, a (possibly) new price vector p˜ with p˜l = 0 and
p˜k = p∗k for k 6= l is also a Nash equilibrium that maximizes
hk(pk, p˜−k) for k = 1, . . . , L.
Thus we have proved that, for l = 1, . . . , L,
p∗l Fl(p
∗
l , p
∗
−l) = 0, Fl(p
∗
l , p
∗
−l) ≤ 0, p∗ ≥ 0
which is (6).
2Fl(pl, p
∗
−l) is strictly decreasing unless some xi(p) becomes zero.
5IV. REGULAR NETWORKS
Theorem 2 guarantees the existence of network equilibrium.
We now study its uniqueness properties.
A. Multiple equilibria: examples
In a single-protocol network, if the routing matrix R has
full row rank, then there is a unique active constraint set Lˆ
and a unique equilibrium price p associated with it. If R does
not have full row rank, then equilibrium prices p may be non-
unique but the equilibrium rates x(p) are still unique since the
utility functions are strictly concave.
In contrast, the active constraint set in a multi-protocol
network can be non-unique even if R has full row rank
(Example 2). Clearly, the equilibrium prices associated with
different active constraint sets are different. Moreover, there
can be multiple equilibrium prices associated with the same
active constraint set (Example 1).
Example 1: unique active constraint set but uncountably
many equilibria
In this example, we assume all the sources use the same
utility function
U ji (x
j
i ) = −
1
2
(
1− xji
)2
(15)
Then the equilibrium rates xj of type j sources are determined
by the equilibrium prices p as
xj(p) = 1− (Rj)Tmj(p)
where 1 is a vector of appropriate dimension whose entries
are all 1s. We use linear price mapping functions:
mj(p) = Kjp
where Kj are L×L diagonal matrices. Then the equilibrium
rate vector of type j sources can be expressed as
xj(p) = 1− (Rj)TKjp
When only links with strictly positive equilibrium prices are
included in the model, we have
y(p) =
J∑
j=1
Rjxj(p) = c
Substituting in xj(p) yields
J∑
j=1
Rj(Rj)TKjp =
J∑
j=1
Rj1− c
which is a linear equation in p for given Rj , Kj , and c. It has
a unique solution if the determinant is nonzero, but has no or
multiple solutions if
det
 J∑
j=1
Rj(Rj)TKj
 = 0
When J = 1, i.e., there is only one protocol, and R1 has
full row rank, det(R1(R1)TK1) > 0 since both R1(R1)T
and K1 are positive definite. In this case, there is a unique
equilibrium price vector. When J = 2, there are networks
whose determinants are zero that have uncountably many
equilibria. See Appendix VIII-B for an example where R does
not have full row rank. We provide here an example with
J = 3 where R still has full row rank.
The network is shown in Figure 1 with three unit-capacity
links, cl = 1. There are three different protocols with the
1x1 2x
1
1x2
1x3
3x1
2x2
Fig. 1. Example 1: uncountably many equilibria.
corresponding routing matrices
R1 = I, R2 =
[
1 1 0
0 1 1
]T
, R3 = (1, 1, 1)T
The linear mapping functions are given by
K1 = I, K2 = diag(5, 1, 5), K3 = diag(1, 3, 1)
It is easy to calculate that
3∑
i=1
Ri(Ri)TKi =
 7 4 16 6 6
1 4 7

which has determinant 0. Using the utility function defined in
(15), we can check that the following are equilibrium prices
for all ² ∈ [0, 1/24]:
p11 = p
1
3 = 1/8 + ² p
1
2 = 1/4− 2²
The corresponding rates are
x11 = x
1
3 = 7/8− ² x12 = 3/4 + 2²
x21 = x
2
2 = 1/8− 3² x31 = 4²
All capacity constraints are tight with these rates. Since there
is an one-link flow at every link, the active constraint set
is unique and contains every link. Yet there are uncountably
many equilibria.
Example 2: multiple active constraint sets each with a
unique equilibrium
Consider the symmetric network in Figure 2 with 3 flows.
There are two protocols in the network with the following
routing matrices
R1 =
 1 01 1
0 1
 , R2 = (1, 1, 1)T
Flows (1, 1) and (1, 2) have identical utility function U1 and
source rate x1, and flow (2, 1) has a utility function U2 and
source rate x2.
61x1 2x1
1x2
Fig. 2. Example 2: two active constraint sets.
Links 1 and 3 both have capacity c1 and price mapping
functions m11(p) = p and m21(p) for protocols 1 and 2 respec-
tively. Link 2 has capacity c2 and price mapping functions
m12(p) = p and m22(p).
In [29], we prove that when assumption A1 holds, the
network shown in Figure 2 has two equilibria provided:
1) c1 < c2 < 2c1;
2) for j = 1, 2, (U j)′(xj) → pj , possibly ∞, if and only
if xj → 0.
3) for l = 1, 2, m2l (pl)→ p2 as pl → p1, and satisfy
2m21((U
1)′(c2 − c1)) < (U2)′(2c1 − c2)
< m22((U
1)′(c2 − c1))
By manipulating buffer sizes and RED parameters, i.e.,
carefully designing the price mapping functions mjl , we have
demonstrated experimentally in [29] the phenomenon of mul-
tiple equilibria for this example using TCP Reno, which reacts
to loss probability, and TCP Vegas/FAST, which react to delay.
3
B. Regular networks
Examples 1 and 2 show that global uniqueness is generally
not guaranteed in a multi-protocol network. We now show,
however, that local uniqueness is basically a generic property
of the equilibrium set. We present our main results on the
structure of the equilibrium set here, providing conditions for
the equilibrium points to be locally unique, finite and odd in
number, and globally unique. We prove these results in the
next subsection.
Consider an equilibrium price p∗ ∈ E. Recall the active
constraint set Lˆ defined by p∗. The equilibrium price pˆ∗ for
the links in Lˆ is a solution of
yˆ(pˆ) = cˆ (16)
By the inverse function theorem, the solution of (16), and
hence the equilibrium price pˆ∗, is locally unique if the Jacobian
matrix Jˆ(pˆ∗) = ∂yˆ/∂pˆ is nonsingular at pˆ∗. We call a network
(c,m,R,U) regular if all its equilibrium prices are locally
unique.
The next result shows that almost all networks are regular,
and that regular networks have finitely many equilibrium
3It is pointed out in [27] that there is actually a third equilibrium for this
network where all links are actively constrained. However, unlike the other
two equilibria, the third is not locally stable and hence did not manifest itself
in the experiments reported in [29].
prices. This justifies restricting our attention to regular net-
works.
Theorem 3. Suppose assumptions A1 and A2 hold. Given any
price mapping functions m, any routing matrix R and utility
functions U ,
1) the set of link capacities c for which not all equilibrium
prices are locally unique has Lebesgue measure zero in
<L+.
2) the number of equilibria for a regular network
(c,m,R,U) is finite.
For the rest of this subsection, we narrow our attention to
networks that satisfy an additional assumption:
A3: Every link l has a single-link flow (j, i) with(
U ji
)′
(cl) > 0.
Assumption A3 says that when the price of link l is small
enough, the aggregate rate through it will exceed its capacity.
This ensures that the active constraint set contains all links
and facilitates the application of Poincare-Hopf theorem by
avoiding equilibrium on the boundary (some pl = 0). 4
Since all the equilibria of a regular network have nonsingu-
lar Jacobian matrices, we can define the index I(p) of p ∈ E
as
I(p) =
{
1 if det (J(p)) > 0
−1 if det (J(p)) < 0
Then, we have
Theorem 4. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. Given any
regular network, we have∑
p∈E
I(p) = (−1)L
where L is the number of links.
We give two important consequences of this theorem.
Corollary 5. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. A regular
network has an odd number of equilibria.
Proof. Since both I(p) and (−1)L are odd, the number of
terms in the summation in Theorem 4 must be odd.
Notice that Corollary 5 implies the existence of equilibrium.
Although we proved this in Section III in a more general
setting, this simple corollary shows the power of Theorem
4.
The next result provides a condition for global uniqueness.
We say that an equilibrium p∗ ∈ E is locally stable if the
4It is recently shown in [27] that A3 is not necessary and one can
generalize Theorem 4 to∑
p∈E
(−1)Lˆ(p)I(p) = 1
where Lˆ(p) is the number of links of the active constraint set associated
with equilibrium p. Clearly, if Lˆ(p) = L, it reduces to Theorem 4. This
generalized theorem also allows [27] to conclude the number of equilibria
is odd (and therefore existence) without A3. In this paper, although A3 is
imposed, all results can be viewed as with respect to a fixed active constraint
set with appropriate modifications. In particular, the global uniqueness results
in Section V directly apply without A3 since Jˆ has a similar structure as J
except with a smaller dimension.
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that is, every eigenvalue of J(p∗) = ∂y(p∗)/∂p has negative
real part. For justification of this definition, local stability of
p∗ implies that the gradient algorithm (19) below converges
locally.
Theorem 6. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. The equilib-
rium of a regular network is globally unique if and only
if every equilibrium point in E has an index (−1)L. In
particular, if all equilibria are locally stable, then E contains
exactly one point.
Proof: The first claim of the theorem directly follows from
Theorem 4. We now claim that an equilibrium p∗ ∈ E which
is locally stable has an index I(p∗) of (−1)L. To prove
the claim, consider a locally stable equilibrium price p∗. All
the eigenvalues of J(p∗) have negative real parts. Moreover,
since J(p∗) has real entries, complex eigenvalues come in
conjugate pairs. The determinant of J(p∗) is the product of
all its eigenvalues. If there are k conjugate pairs of complex
eigenvalues and L − 2k real eigenvalues, the product of all
eigenvalues has the same sign as (−1)L−2k which has the
same sign as (−1)L. Hence the index of a locally stable
equilibrium is (−1)L.
This result may seem surprising at the first sight as it relates
the local stability of an algorithm to the uniqueness property of
a network. This is because both equilibrium and local stability
are defined in terms of the function y(p): an equilibrium p∗
satisfies y(p∗) = c and the local asymptotic stability of p∗ is
determined by ∂y(p∗)/∂p. The connection between these two
properties is made exact by the index theorem. An implication
of this result is that if there are multiple equilibria, then
no algorithm p˙ = f(p(t)), whose linearization around each
equilibrium p∗ ∈ E satisfies ∂f(p∗)/∂p = ∂y(p∗)/∂p, can be
found to locally stabilize all of the equilibria.
Theorem 6 will be used in Section V to derive a sufficient
condition on price mapping functions m for global uniqueness.
We close this subsection with an example that illustrates the
application of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5.
Example 3: illustration of Theorem 4 and Corollary 5
We revisit Example 1 with modified utility functions. Recall
that in Example 1, as ² varies from 0 to 1/24, we trace out all
equilibrium points. The components x11 and q11 = p11 of these
equilibrium points are shown by the (red) solid line in Figure 3.
Other sources xji and their effective end-to-end prices q
j
i also
lie on similar straight lines. Since the network has uncountably
many equilibrium points, it is not regular. To make it regular,
suppose we change the utility functions of sources (j, i) to
U ji (x
j
i , α
j
i ) =
{
βji (x
j
i )
1−αji /(1− αji ) if αji 6= 1
βji log x
j
i if α
j
i = 1
with appropriately chosen positive constants αji and β
j
i . These
utility functions can be viewed as a weighted version of the
α-fairness utility functions proposed in [22].
The basic idea of how to choose αji and β
j
i to generate
only finitely many equilibrium points is as follows. First, we
pick two points in the equilibrium set of Example 1, say,
the points associated with ² = 0.01 and ² = 0.04. These
choices of ² provide two distinct equilibrium points (q, x) and
(q˜, x˜). For instance, (q11 , x11) = (0.135, 0.865) corresponds
to ² = 0.01 and (q˜11 , x˜11) = (0.165, 0.835) corresponds to
² = 0.04, as illustrated in Figure 3. Then, for each source
x 11
q 11
1
=(β1
1/q1
1)1/α
1
1  x 1
5/6
7/8
1/8 1/6
  
(0.135,0.865)
 
 
(0.165,0.835)
Fig. 3. Example 3: construction of multiple isolated equilibria.
(j, i), find αji and β
j
i such that (4) is satisfied by the two
equilibrium points (qji , x
j
i ) and (q˜
j
i , x˜
j
i ) with the new utility
functions. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where relation (4) with
the new utility function is represented by the (blue) curve, and
αji , β
j
i are chosen so that the curve passes through the original
equilibrium points (x11, q11) and (q˜, x˜). More specifically, given
two equilibrium points (qji , x
j
i ) and (q˜
j
i , x˜
j
i ), choose
αji =
log(qji )− log(q˜ji )
log(x˜ji )− log(xji )
βji = q
j
i
(
xji
)αji
The resulting αji and β
j
i for all flows (j, i) are shown in Table
I.
TABLE I
EXAMPLE 3: αji AND β
j
i .
Flows αji β
j
i
x11 5.6851 0.0592
x12 4.0285 0.0803
x13 5.6851 0.0592
x21 0.0322 0.8389
x22 0.0322 0.8389
x31 0.0963 0.7041
By construction, both (p11 = 0.135, p12 = 0.230) and (p11 =
0.165, p12 = 0.170) are network equilibria. By Corollary 5,
there is at least one additional equilibrium. Numerical search
indeed located a third equilibrium with (p11 = 0.142, p12 =
0.206).
We further check the local stability of these three equilibria
under the gradient algorithm (19) to be introduced in Section
IV-C. The eigenvalues and index for each equilibrium are
shown in Table II. It turns out that the equilibrium (p11 =
0.142, p12 = 0.206) is not stable and has index 1, while the
8TABLE II
EXAMPLE 3: STABILITY AND INDICES OF EQUILIBRIA.
Equilibria (p1, p2, p3) Eigenvalues Index
(0.135, 0.23, 0.135) −0.21,−17.43,−26.73 −1
(0.142, 0.206, 0.142) 0.21,−12.32,−22.40 1
(0.165, 0.17, 0.165) −12.41,−1.67,−0.67 −1
other two are stable with index −1. The dynamics of this
network under the gradient algorithm can be illustrated by a
vector field. By symmetry, the equilibrium prices for the first
and third link are always same. Therefore, we can draw the
vector field restricted on the plane p1 = p3 to illustrate the
system dynamics. The phase portrait is shown in Figure 4. The
(red) dots represent the three equilibria. Note the equilibrium
in the middle is a saddle point, and therefore unstable. The
(red) arrows give the direction of this vector field. Individual
trajectories are plotted with slim (blue) lines.
0.1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.2
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.18
0.19
0.2
0.21
0.22
0.23
0.24
0.25
p1
p 2
Fig. 4. Example 3: vector field of (p1, p2).
C. Proofs
In this subsection we provide proofs for the results in
Section IV-B.
Proof of Theorem 3. The main mathematical tool used in
our proof is Sard’s Theorem [4], [28], of which we quote
a version here that is tailored to our problem. Let G be an
open subset of <L+ and let F be a continuously differentiable
function from G to <L+. A point y ∈ G is a critical point of
F if the Jacobian matrix ∂F/∂y of F at y is singular. A point
z ∈ <L+ is a critical value of F if there is a critical point
y ∈ G with z = F (y). A point in <L+ is a regular value of F
if it is not a critical value.
Sard’s theorem. If F : G→ <L+ is continuously differentiable
on the open subset G ⊆ <L+, then the set of critical values of
F has Lebesgue measure zero in <L+.
Fix a routing matrix R and utility functions U . There are
at most 2L − 1 different active constraint sets. Let Lˆ ⊆ L
be such a combination with Lˆ links. Consider the set of all
possible link capacities c = (cl, l ∈ L) under which the active
constraint set is Lˆ, i.e., with such a capacity vector c, an
equilibrium price p has pl > 0 if l ∈ Lˆ and pl = 0 otherwise.
Fix such an equilibrium point p∗. Again let pˆ denote the price
vector only for links in Lˆ. Then pˆ∗ is not locally unique if
the function yˆ : <Lˆ+ → <Lˆ+ defined by yˆ(pˆ) = Rˆx(pˆ) has a
singular Jacobian matrix ∂yˆ/∂pˆ at pˆ∗, i.e., if pˆ∗ is a critical
point of yˆ. The set of such capacity vectors cˆ ∈ <Lˆ+ under
which all links in Lˆ have active constraints in equilibrium
satisfy
yˆ(pˆ∗) = cˆ
and hence are critical values of yˆ. Since yˆ is continuously
differentiable by assumption A1, we can apply Sard’s theorem
and conclude that the set of such capacity vectors cˆ has zero
Lebesgue measure in <Lˆ+. The extension to <L+ for all link
capacities clearly also has zero Lebesgue measure in <L+.
Since we only have a finite number of different active
constraint sets, the union of link capacity vectors that give
rise to locally nonunique equilibria still has zero Lebesgue
measure. This proves the first part of the theorem.
The equilibrium set E defined in (7) is closed because
y(p) is continuous, and is bounded by Lemma 1. Hence E
is compact. Since (c,m,R,U) is a regular network, every
p ∈ E is locally unique, i.e., for each p ∈ E we can find
an open neighborhood such that it is the only equilibrium in
that open set. The union of these open sets forms a cover
for set E. Since E is compact, it admits a finite subcover
[16], i.e., E can be covered by a finite number of open sets
each containing a single equilibrium. Hence, the number of
equilibria is finite.
Proof of Theorem 4. By assumption A3, we can always find
pmin > 0 such that for any price p and link l with pl < pmin,
we have ∑
j
∑
i
Rjlix
j
i (p) > cl
Let G := [pmin, pmax]L where pmax is defined in Lemma 1.
Clearly, all equilibria are in the set G. To prove our result,
we will invoke a version of the Poincare-Hopf Index Theorem
tailored to our problem [32], [20].
Poincare-Hopf index Theorem. Let D be an open subset of <
and v : DL → <L be a smooth vector field, with nonsingular
Jacobian matrix ∂v/∂p at every equilibrium. If there is a G ⊆
DL such that every trajectory moves inward of region G, then
the sum of the indices of the equilibria in G is (−1)L.
Gradient project algorithm. To construct the vector field v
required by the index theorem, let DL = G and consider the
following gradient algorithm from G to G proposed in [14].
The prices are updated at time t according to
p˙(t) = Λ (Rx(t)− c) (17)
where Λ > 0 is an L × L diagonal matrix whose elements
represent stepsizes. A source updates its rate based on the
9end-to-end price
x(t) = x(p(t)) (18)
A consequence of assumption A3 is that p(t) ≥ pmin > 0 for
all t under the gradient algorithm (17)–(18). This guarantees a
unique active constraint set that is L. Hence the equilibrium set
E defined in (7) is equivalent to E = {p ∈ <L+ | y(p)−c = 0}.
Combining (17)–(18) with y(p(t)) = Rx(t) yields the
required vector field v:
p˙(t) = Λ(y(p(t))− c) =: v(p(t)) (19)
whose Jacobian matrix is:
∂v
∂p
(p) = ΛJ(p) = Λ
∂y
∂p
(p) (20)
where J(p) is given by (8). Clearly, p∗ is an equilibrium point
of v, i.e., v(p∗) = 0, if and only if p∗ is a network equilibrium,
i.e., p∗ ∈ E. Since the network (c,m,R,U) is regular, J(p) is
nonsingular at every network equilibrium p∗ ∈ E ⊂ G. Since
Λ is a positive diagonal matrix, ∂v(p)/∂p is also nonsingular
by (20) at all its equilibrium points p in G, as the index
theorem requires.
Consider any point p on the boundary of G. For any l, we
have one of two cases:
1) If pl(t) = pmax, link l will be underutilized, yl(p(t)) <
cl, and p˙l < 0 according to (19).
2) If pl(t) = pmin, the aggregate rate at link l will exceed
cl, yl(p(t)) > cl, and p˙l > 0 according to (19).
Therefore, every point p on the boundary of G will move
inward and our result directly follows from the Poincare-Hopf
index theorem.
V. GLOBAL UNIQUENESS: MAPPING FUNCTIONS m(p)
In this and the next sections, we provide sufficient condi-
tions on the structure of the network for global uniqueness.
We also provide some important special cases in Appendix
VIII-A where global uniqueness is set up. In this section, we
show that, under assumptions A1–A3, if the price mapping
functions mjl are similar, then the equilibrium of a regular
network is globally unique.
A. Main result
To state the result concisely, we need the notion of permuta-
tion. We call a vector σ = (σ1, . . . , σL) a permutation if each
σl is distinct and takes value in {1, . . . , L}. Treating σ as a
mapping σ : {1, . . . , L} → {1, . . . , L}, we let σ−1 denote
its unique inverse permutation. For any vector a ∈ <L, σ(a)
denotes the permutation of a under σ, i.e., [σ(a)]l = aσl .
If a ∈ {1, . . . , L}L is a permutation, then σ(a) is also a
permutation and we often write σa instead. Let l = (1, . . . , L)
denote the identity permutation. Then σl = σ. See [19] for
more details. Finally, denote dmjl /dpl by m˙
j
l .
Theorem 7. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. If, for any
vector j ∈ {1, . . . , J}L and any permutations σ,k,n in
{1, . . . , L}L,
L∏
l=1
m˙
[k(j)]l
l +
L∏
l=1
m˙
[n(j)]l
l ≥
L∏
l=1
m˙
[σ(j)]l
l (21)
then the equilibrium of a regular network is globally unique.
Theorem 7 implies that if the (slopes of the) price mapping
functions are “similar”, then global uniqueness is guaranteed,
as the following corollary shows: if mjl do not differ much
across source types at each link, or they do not differ much
along links in every source’s path, then the equilibrium is
unique.
Corollary 8. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. The equilib-
rium of a regular network is globally unique if any one of the
following conditions holds:
1) For each l = 1, . . . , L, j = 1, . . . , J
m˙jl ∈
[
al, 2
1
L al
]
for some al > 0 (22)
2) For all j = 1, . . . , J , l = 1, . . . , L
m˙jl ∈
[
aj , 2
1
L aj
]
for some aj > 0 (23)
Proof. If (22) holds, we have for any jl, jˆl, j˜l in {1, . . . , J}
L∏
l=1
m˙jll +
L∏
l=1
m˙jˆll ≥ 2
∏L
l=1 al =
∏L
l=1 2
1
L al ≥
L∏
l=1
m˙j˜ll
which implies the sufficient condition in Theorem 7.
For the second assertion, fix any j in {1, . . . , L}L and any
permutations σ,k,n in {1, . . . , L}L. If (23) holds, we have
L∏
l=1
m˙
[k(j)]l
l +
L∏
l=1
m˙
[n(j)]l
l ≥ 2
L∏
l=1
ajl =
L∏
l=1
2
1
L ajl
≥
L∏
l=1
m˙[σ(j)]l
which implies the sufficient condition in Theorem 7.
Remarks:
1) Asymptotically when L→∞, both conditions (22) and
(23) converge to a single point. Condition (22) reduces
to m˙jl = al which essentially says that all protocols are
the same (J = 1). Condition (23) reduces to m˙jl = aj ,
which is the linear link independent case discussed in
Theorem 16.
2) The sufficient condition in Theorem 7 can be conserva-
tive because many rjpi may be zero (no source of type j
takes path pi).
3) These link-based uniqueness results hold for a network
whenever no flow uses more than L links.
B. Proof
We now prove Theorem 7. By Theorem 6, we only need
to prove that I(p) = (−1)L for any equilibrium p ∈ E.
Since det(J(p)) = (−1)L det(−J(p)), the condition reduces
to det(−J(p)) > 0. Now
−J(p) = −
∑
j
RjDj(p)
(
Rj
)T ∂mj
∂p
(p)
=
∑
j
BjM j
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where M j = M j(p) = ∂m
j
∂p (p) is a diagonal matrix, and
Bj = Bj(p) is defined by its elements
Bjkl =
∑
i
RkiRli
(
− ∂
2U ji
∂(xji )2
)−1
(24)
Hence
det(−J(p)) = det
∑
j
BjM j

=
∑
k
sgnk
L∏
l=1
J∑
j=1
[
BjM j
]
kll
(25)
Here, the summation over k = (k1, . . . , kL) ∈ {1, . . . , L}L
is over all L! permutations of the L items {1, . . . , L}. The
function sgnk is 1 if the minimum number of pairwise
interchanges necessary to achieve the permutation k starting
from (1, 2, . . . , L) is even and −1 if it is odd.
Let pi denote an L-bit binary sequence that represents the
path consisting of exactly those links k for which the kth
entries of pi are 1, i.e., pik = 1. Let Π(k, l) := {pi|pik = pil =
1} be the set of paths that contain both links k and l. Let
Ijpi = {i|Rjli = 1 if and only if pil = 1} be the set of type j
sources on path pi, possibly empty. Let
rjpi = r
j
pi(p) =
∑
i∈Ijpi
(
− ∂
2U ji
∂(xji )2
)−1
(26)
where rjpi is zero if Ijpi is empty. Since all utility functions are
assumed concave, rjpi ≥ 0. Then we have from (24) and (26)
Bjkl =
∑
pi∈Π(k,l)
rjpi (27)
This together with (25) implies
det(−J(p)) =
∑
k
sgnk
L∏
l=1
J∑
j=1
m˙jl ∑
pi∈Π(kl,l)
rjpi
(28)
Consider any sequence aij , j ∈ Ji, i = 1, . . . , I , where Ji
is a finite index set that depends on i. We have
I∏
i=1
∑
j∈Ji
aij =
∑
j
I∏
i=1
aiji (29)
where j denotes the vector index j = (j1, . . . , JI) and the
summation is over all values in J1 × . . .× JI .
Using (29) to change the order of product over l and
summation over j in (28), we have
det(−J(p)) =
∑
k
sgnk
∑
j
L∏
l=1
m˙jll ∑
pi∈Π(kl,l)
rjlpi

where the vector index j = (j1, . . . , jL) ranges over
{1, . . . , J}L. Applying (29) again to change the order of
product over l and summation over the index pi, we have
det(−J(p)) =
∑
k
sgnk
∑
j
µ(j)
∑
pi∈Π(k,l)
ρ(j,pi)(30)
where
µ(j) :=
L∏
l=1
m˙jll (31)
ρ(j,pi) :=
L∏
l=1
rjl
pil
(32)
The last summation in (30) is over the vector in-
dex pi = (pi1, . . . , piL) that takes value in the set
{ all L-bit binary sequences }L. As mentioned above, l =
(1, . . . , L) denotes the identity permutation, and “pi ∈
Π(k, l)” is a shorthand for “pil ∈ Π(kl, l), l = 1, . . . , L”.
Denote by 1(a) the indicator function that is 1 if the assertion
a is true and 0 otherwise. Then (30) becomes
det(−J(p)) =
∑
j
∑
pi
C(j,pi) ρ(j,pi) (33)
where
C(j,pi) :=
∑
k
1(pi ∈ Π(k, l)) sgnk µ(j) (34)
Hence det(−J(p)) is a summation, over the index (j,pi),
of terms ρ(j,pi) with coefficients C(j,pi). We now show that
only those terms for which the constituent rjpi in the product
ρ(j,pi) are all distinct have nonzero coefficients.
Lemma 9. Consider a term in the summation in (33) indexed
by (j,pi). If there are integers a, b ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that
ja = jb and pia = pib, then C(j,pi) = 0.
Proof. Fix any (j,pi). Suppose without loss of generality that
j1 = j1 and pi1 = pi2 and ρ(j,pi) 6= 0. We now show that its
coefficient C(j,pi) = 0.
Consider any permutation k in (34) that gives a nonzero
coefficient in C(j,pi):
1(pi ∈ Π(k, l)) sgnk µ(j) = sgnkµ(j) (35)
This means that
pi1 ∈ Π(k1, 1) and pi2 ∈ Π(k2, 2)
Hence, since pi1 = pi2, the path pi1 goes through all links
1, 2, k1, k2. In particular
pi1 ∈ Π(k2, 1) and pi2 ∈ Π(k1, 2)
Therefore there is a permutation kˆ in (34) with kˆ1 = k2,
kˆ2 = k1, and kˆl = kl for l ≥ 3 for which 1(pi ∈ Π(kˆ, l)) = 1
but sgnkˆ = −sgnk. This yields a term −sgnk µ(j) in C(j,pi)
which exactly cancels the term in (35). Since the argument
applies to any k in (34), C(j,pi) = 0.
In view of Lemma 9, we will restrict the summation over
the index (j,pi) in (33) to the largest subset of {1, . . . , J}L
where the constituent rjpi in ρ(j,pi) are all distinct. Let Θ
denote this subset. We abuse notation and define permutation
σ ∈ {1, . . . , L}L on Θ by
σ(j,pi) = (σ(j),σ(pi))
Then let Θ0 be the largest subset of Θ that is permutationally
distinct, i.e., no vector in Θ0 is a permutation of another
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vector in Θ0. The set of permutations σ ∈ {1, . . . , L}L is
in one-one correspondence with the set of (j′,pi′) that are
permutations of a given (j,pi) in Θ0.5 This allows us to carry
out the summation over (j,pi) in (33) first over (j,pi) that are
permutationally distinct and then over all their permutations.
Notice that, given any (j,pi) and any permutation σ, we have
from (32)
ρ(σ(j),σ(pi)) = ρ(j,pi)
i.e., ρ is invariant to permutations. Hence, we can rewrite (33)–
(34) as
det(−J(p)) =
∑
(j,pi)∈Θ0
D(j,pi) ρ(j,pi) (36)
where
D(j,pi) =
∑
σ
∑
k
1(σ(pi) ∈ Π(k, l)) sgnk µ(σ(j))
(37)
In the above, L-vectors σ and k are permutations.
The next lemma converts a condition on σ(pi) into one on
pi. It follows directly from the definition of permutation.
Lemma 10. For any pi and any permutations σ,k, we have
σ(pi) ∈ Π(k, l) ⇔ pi ∈ Π(σ−1k,σ−1)
i.e., [σ(pi)]l ∈ Π(kl, l) for all l if and only if pil ∈
Π(kσ−1l , σ
−1
l ) for all l.
Applying Lemma 10 to (37), we have
D(j,pi) =
∑
σ
∑
k
1(pi ∈ Π(σ−1k,σ−1)) sgnk µ(σ(j))
Since k, and hence σ−1k, range over all possible permuta-
tions, we can replace the index variable σ−1k by k to get
D(j,pi) =
∑
σ
∑
k
1(pi ∈ Π(k,σ−1)) sgn(kσ)µ(σ(j))
(38)
We now use (38) to derive a sufficient condition under which
D(j,pi) are nonnegative for all permutationally distinct (j,pi).
The main idea is to show that for every negative term in
the summation in (38), either it can be exactly canceled by
a positive term, or we can find two positive terms whose sum
has a larger or equal magnitude under the given condition.
This lemma directly implies Theorem 7.
Lemma 11. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. Suppose for
any j ∈ {1, . . . , J}L and any permutations σ,k,n in
{1, . . . , L}L, we have for a regular network
µ(k(j)) + µ(n(j)) ≥ µ(σ(j))
Then, for all (j,pi) ∈ Θ0, D(j,pi) ≥ 0.
Proof. Fix any (j,pi) ∈ Θ0. Each term in (38) is indexed by
a pair (σ,k).
5The one-one correspondence fails to hold for permutations not in Θ.
Fix also a permutation σ in (38). Suppose there is only
one permutation k for which the term indexed by (σ,k) has
a negative sign given by 1(pi ∈ Π(k,σ−1))sgn(kσ) = −1.
This term is then −µ(σ(j)) < 0. Since the summation over
k ranges over all permutations, we can find a positive term,
indexed by (σ, kˆ) with kˆ = σ−1, that exactly cancels this
negative term. This is because 1(pi ∈ Π(kˆ,σ−1)) is always 1
and sgn(kˆσ) = sgnl = 1, yielding the term µ(σ(j)). Hence
we have shown that, given σ, if there is only one k that yields
a negative term, then it is always canceled by another positive
term indexed by (σ, kˆ) with kˆ = σ−1.
Given a σ, suppose now there are two permutations k,n
for which
pi ∈ Π(k,σ−1) and pi ∈ Π(n,σ−1) (39)
and sgn(kσ) = sgn(nσ) = −1. Each of (σ,k) and (σ,n)
yields a negative term −µ(σ(j)) in the summation in (38).
Notice that (39) says that, for all l = 1, . . . , L, paths pil
contains link pairs (kl, σ−1l ) and (nl, σ
−1
l ). Hence pi
l also pass
through link pairs (σ−1l , σ
−1
l ), (kl, nl) and (nl, kl), i.e.,
pi ∈ Π(σ−1,σ−1)) (40)
pi ∈ Π(k,n), pi ∈ Π(n,k) (41)
(40) implies that there is a positive term in the summation in
(38) indexed by (σ, kˆ) with kˆ = σ−1:
sgn(σ−1σ)µ(σ(j)) = µ(σ(j)) > 0
It cancels the negative term −µ(σ(j)) in the summation
indexed by (σ,k).
To deal with the negative term −µ(σ(j)) indexed by (σ,n),
note that (41) implies that there are two nonzero terms in the
summation, indexed by (n−1,k) and (k−1,n), that we now
argue are positive. Indeed the term indexed by (n−1,k) is
sgn(kn−1) µ(n−1(j)) = sgn(kσ(nσ)−1) µ(n−1(j))
= sgn(kσ) sgn(nσ)−1 µ(n−1(j))
= µ(n−1(j)) > 0
where we have used the hypothesis that sgn(kσ) = −1 and
sgn(nσ)−1 = sgn(nσ) = −1. Similarly, the term with index
(k−1,n) is µ(k−1(j)). The hypothesis of the lemma implies
that
µ(n−1(j)) + µ(k−1(j))− µ(σ(j)) ≥ 0
Hence, we have shown that, given σ, if there are two negative
terms in the summation in (38) indexed by (σ,k) and (σ,n),
then we can always find three positive terms, indexed by,
(σ,σ−1), (n−1,k) and (k−1,n), so that the sum of these
five terms are nonnegative.
If there are more than two negative terms, take any ad-
ditional negative term, indexed by, say, (σ, nˆ). The same
argument shows that it will be compensated by the two
(unique) positive terms indexed by (nˆ−1,k) and (k−1, nˆ).
This completes the proof.
Since the network is regular, det(−J(p)) 6= 0. Lemma
11, together with (36), imply that det(−J(p)) > 0, or
equivalently, I(p) = (−1)L for any p ∈ E, under the condition
of the lemma. Theorem 7 then follows from Theorem 6.
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C. Special case: L = 3 and J = 2
We now specialize our uniqueness result to the case of
L = 3, J = 2, and illustrate with an example the proofs
of Theorem 7 and Lemma 11. This case is of both theoretical
and practical interest. Theoretically, it represents the smallest
network that can exhibit non-unique equilibrium points if A1–
A3 are satisfied. Practically, empirical study shows that very
few paths in the Internet (about 3%) experience more than
three bottleneck links [26].
Theorem 12. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold for a 3-links
regular network with 2 protocols. If the following 6 inequalities
hold, the network has a unique equilibrium:
λ2 + λ3 ≥ λ1, λ1 + λ3 ≥ λ2, λ1 + λ2 ≥ λ3
1
λ2
+
1
λ3
≥ 1
λ1
, 1λ1 +
1
λ3
≥ 1λ2 ,
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
≥ 1
λ3
where λl := m˙1l (p)/m˙2l (p).
Proof. It is straightforward to check that only the following
six ρ(j,pi) in (36) can have negative coefficients D(j,pi):
(λ2 + λ3 − λ1)m˙21m˙22m˙23r1111r2101r2110 (42)
(λ1 + λ3 − λ2)m˙21m˙22m˙23r1111r2011r2110
(λ1 + λ2 − λ3)m˙21m˙22m˙23r1111r2011r2101
(
1
λ2
+
1
λ3
− 1
λ1
)m˙11m˙
1
2m˙
1
3r
2
111r
1
101r
1
110
(
1
λ1
+
1
λ3
− 1
λ2
)m˙11m˙
1
2m˙
1
3r
2
111r
1
011r
1
110
(
1
λ1
+
1
λ2
− 1
λ3
)m˙11m˙
1
2m˙
1
3r
2
111r
1
011r
1
101
The condition in the theorem guarantees that these terms are
all nonnegative. By (36), det(−J(p)) ≥ 0. Since the network
is regular, we have det(−J(p)) > 0 for all equilibria p. Hence
the equilibrium is globally unique.
A straightforward corollary is the following
Corollary 13. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. For a 3-links
regular network with 2 protocols, if, for all l, λl ∈ [a, 2a] for
some constant a > 0, the network admits a globally unique
equilibrium.
Remark: If m˙jl = kj are link independent , then λl = k1/k2 ∈
[a, 2a] for any k1/2k2 ≤ a ≤ k1/k2. Hence global uniqueness
is guaranteed, which agrees with Theorem 16.
We illustrate in Figures 5 and 6 the regions of λl in Theorem
12 and Corollary 13. They are both cones. The first one is the
projection to λ1 − λ2 plane and the second one is the cross-
section cut by plane λ1 + λ2 = 1.
We close this subsection by illustrating how we determine
the coefficient D(j,pi) in the proof of Lemma 11. Consider
the term for ρ(j,pi) = r1111r2101r2110 in (42). Here j = (1, 2, 2)
and pi = ((111), (101), (110)). By (37), we need to look at
the sum over σ and k. First, look at σ = (3, 1, 2), the only
k such that 1(σ(pi) ∈ Π(k, l)) = 1 and sgnk = −1 is k =
(2, 1, 3). By the argument in the proof of Lemma 11, if we
let k = l = (1, 2, 3), we have 1(σ(pi) ∈ Π(k, l)) = 1 and
sgnk = 1 and the sum of these two terms in (37) is zero.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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6
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9
10
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λ 2
λ1=λ2=λ3
From Corollary 13
From Theorem 12 
Fig. 5. Region of λl for global uniqueness: projection to λ1 − λ2 plane.
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2 )−0.25pi)
λ 3
From Theorem 12 
From Corollary 13 
λ1=λ2=λ3 
Fig. 6. Region of λl for global uniqueness: cross-section cut by plane
λ1 + λ2 = 1.
We can visualize this operation as follow. Each entry of
−J(p) is a sum of m˙jl rjpi with appropriate signs. When we
expand its determinant, we obtain, from (36)–(37), a sum,
over a set of source types j, paths pi and permutations σ,k, of
terms ρ(j,pi) which are products of rjpi. Hence we can identify
each term in (36)–(37), indexed by (j,pi,σ,k), with the
original position in −J(p) of each constituent rjpi in ρ(j,pi).
This is illustrated below: the negative term r1111r2110
r2101
 (σ = (3, 1, 2),k = (2, 1, 3), sgnk = −1)
is canceled exactly by the positive term r2110 r1111
r2101
 (σ = (3, 1, 2),k = (1, 2, 3), sgnk = 1)
Similarly, we have the following two terms that cancel one
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another: r1111r2110
r2101
 (σ = (2, 3, 1),k = (3, 2, 1), sgnk = −1)
 r2101 r2110
r1111
 (σ = (2, 3, 1),k = (1, 2, 3), sgnk = 1)
Now consider σ = (1, 3, 2). We have the following two
terms with sgnk = −1. r2101r2110
r1111
 (σ = (1, 3, 2),k = (3, 2, 1), sgnk = −1)
 r2110r1111
r2101
 (σ = (1, 3, 2),k = (2, 1, 3), sgnk = −1)
Setting k = l = (1, 2, 3) gives the following positive term: r1111 r2110
r2101
 (σ = (1, 3, 2),k = (1, 2, 3), sgnk = 1)
As described in the proof of Lemma 11, we can find
two positive terms indexed by some (σ,k). One is (σ =
(3, 2, 1)(1, 3, 2) = (2, 3, 1),k = (3, 2, 1)−1(2, 1, 3) =
(3, 1, 2)) and the other is (σ = (2, 1, 3)(1, 3, 2) =
(3, 1, 2),k = (2, 1, 3)−1(3, 2, 1) = (2, 3, 1)). They can be
visualized as following: r2110 r1111
r2101
 (σ = (2, 3, 1),k = (3, 1, 2), sgnk = 1)
 r2101r2110
r1111
 (σ = (3, 1, 2),k = (2, 3, 1), sgnk = 1)
For pi = ((111), (101), (110)), we can actually verify
that only the nine terms discussed above have 1(σ(pi) ∈
Π(k, l))sgnk 6= 0. Therefore, the coefficient D(j,pi) =
µ((2, 3, 1)(j)) + µ((3, 1, 2)(j))− µ((1, 3, 2)(j)). Noting j =
(1, 2, 2), we finally get
D(j,pi) = µ((2, 2, 1)) + µ((2, 1, 2))− µ((1, 2, 2))
= m˙21m˙
2
2m˙
1
3 + m˙
1
1m˙
1
2m˙
2
3 − m˙11m˙22m˙23
= (λ3 + λ2 − λ1)m˙21m˙22m˙23
VI. GLOBAL UNIQUENESS: JACOBIAN J(P)
In a single-protocol network, for the equilibrium price to
be unique, it is sufficient that the routing matrix R has full
row rank. Otherwise, only the source rates are unique, not
necessarily the link prices. In a multi-protocol network, this
is no longer sufficient. We now provide another sufficient
condition that plays the same role in a multi-protocol network
as the rank condition on R does in a single-protocol network
(see also the remark after Theorem 15).
Let f = (f1, ..., fn) be a vector of real-valued functions
defined on <n. Let G := {z ∈ <n|f(z) = 0} and coG be its
convex hull. Define a set V (G) of vectors as
V (G) := {v|v = φ− ψ for ψ, φ ∈ coG} (43)
as a function of the set G.
Lemma 14. If for every z ∈ coG, the Jacobian matrix J(z) =
∂f(z)/∂z exists and vTJ(z)v < 0 for all v ∈ V (G), then G
contains at most one point.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume there are two
distinct points φ and ψ in G such that f(φ) = f(ψ) = 0. Let
g(θ) := φ+ θ(ψ − φ) where θ ∈ [0, 1]
Then
df(g(θ))
dθ
= J(g(θ))
dg(θ)
dθ
= J(g(θ))(ψ − φ)
Hence,
f(ψ)− f(φ) =
∫ 1
0
J(g(θ))(ψ − φ)dθ
Multiplying both sides by (ψ − φ)T yields
(ψ − φ)T (f(ψ)− f(φ)) =∫ 1
0
(ψ − φ)TJ(g(θ))(ψ − φ)dθ
The left hand-side of the above equation is 0, and the right-
hand side is negative under the assumption of the theorem.
This contradiction proves the theorem.
Let f = y, and let G = E be the set of network equilibria.
Then Lemma 14, together with Theorem 2, provides a suffi-
cient condition for global uniqueness of network equilibrium.
Theorem 15. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold. If for every
price vector p ∈ coE, the Jacobian matrix J(p) defined in (8)
exists and vTJ(p)v < 0 for all v ∈ V (E), then there exists a
globally unique network equilibrium.
In the single-protocol case, a similar result has been ob-
tained in [22]. However, for that case, the Jacobian matrix is
negative definite when R has full row rank. Then the condition
in Theorem 15 always holds and the equilibrium is unique. In
the multi-protocol case, the Jacobian matrix is in general not
symmetric and hence not negative definite. Therefore R having
full row rank is no longer sufficient for the condition in the
theorem to hold.
Since we do not know the equilibrium set E, the condition
in the theorem cannot be directly applied to prove global
uniqueness. To use the theorem, however, it is sufficient to
find a convex superset E˜ of E and a superset V˜ of V (E)
such that vTJ(p)v < 0 for all p ∈ E˜ and v ∈ V˜ . This implies
the condition in Theorem 15 and hence global uniqueness. We
illustrate this procedure in the next example.
Example 4: application of Theorem 15 to verify global
uniqueness
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We visit Example 1 for the third time but using log utility
functions for all sources, i.e.,
U ji (x
j
i ) = log(x
j
i ) for all (j, i) (44)
Let the Jacobian matrix be
J(p) =
 J11 J12 J13J21 J22 J23
J31 J32 J33

where Jkl = Jkl(p) are functions of prices p given by (8). For
example
J11 = − 1
p21
− 5
(5p1 + p2)2
− 1
(p1 + p3 + 3p2)2
It can be seen that J(p) is not negative definite for general p
unlike in the single-protocol case. Even though E can be hard
to find, we demonstrate how to find a simple convex superset
E˜ of E and a simple superset V˜ of V (E).
Consider the convex set
E˜ := {p ∈ <3+ | 1 ≤ p1 = p3 ≤ 2, 1 ≤ p2 ≤ 2}
We claim that E ⊆ E˜. To see this, let p be an equilibrium
price. If p1 < 1, then x11 = 1/p1 will exceed the link capacity
1, and hence p1 ≥ 1. A similar argument gives p2 ≥ 1. To see
p1 ≤ 2, assume it is not true. Then
x11 = 1/p1 < 1/2
x21 = 1/(5p1 + p2) < 1/11
x31 = 1/(2p1 + 3p2) < 1/7
Summing them yields x11 + x21 + x31 < 1. Hence the network
is not in equilibrium, contradicting that p is an equilibrium
price. Hence p1 ≤ 2. The argument for p2 ≤ 2 is similar.
Using the definition of E˜, we can bound all Jkl(p) for p ∈
E˜. The results are collected in Table III.
TABLE III
EXAMPLE 4: BOUNDS ON ELEMENTS OF J(p)
Elements Upperbound Lowerbound
J11 −0.2947 −1.1789
J22 −0.2939 −1.1756
J33 −0.2947 −1.1789
J23 −0.0447 −0.1789
J32 −0.0369 −0.1478
J12 −0.0369 −0.1478
J21 −0.0447 −0.1789
J13 −0.0100 −0.0400
J31 −0.0100 −0.0400
Let
V˜ := {v ∈ <3+ | v1 = v3}
We claim that V (E) ⊆ V˜ . To show this, note that coE ⊆ E˜
since coE is the smallest convex set that contains E. Hence
V (E) ⊆ V (E˜). Since p1 = p3 at equilibrium, v1 = v3 holds
for any v ∈ V (E˜) from the definition of E˜. Hence, V (E˜) ⊆ V˜
and therefore V (E) ⊆ V˜ .
We now check that vTJ(p)v < 0 for all p ∈ E˜ and v ∈ V˜ .
For any v ∈ V˜ , vTJ(p)v is the following quadratic form in
v1 and v2:
vTJ(p)v = v21(J11 + J33 + J13 + J31) +
v1v2(J12 + J21 + J23 + J32) + v22J22
If v1 and v2 have the same signs, then since Jkl are all negative
from Table III, vTJ(p)v < 0. If v1 and v2 have opposite sign,
then a sufficient condition for vTJ(p)v < 0 is
(J12 + J21 + J23 + J32)2 < 4J22(J11 + J33 + J13 + J31)
Using Table III, it is easy to check that the maximum value
of (J12+ J21+ J23+ J32)2− 4J22(J11+ J33+ J13+ J31) is
−0.2895. Therefore we have found a superset E˜ of coE and
a superset V˜ of V (E) such that vTJ(p)v < 0 for all p ∈ E˜
and all v ∈ V˜ . This implies the condition of Theorem 15 and
hence the global uniqueness of network equilibrium.
VII. CONCLUSION
When sources sharing the same network react to different
pricing signals, the current duality model no longer explains
the equilibrium of bandwidth allocation. We have introduced
a mathematical formulation of network equilibrium for multi-
protocol networks and studied several fundamental properties,
such as existence, local uniqueness, number of equilibria, and
global uniqueness. We prove that equilibria exist, and are
almost always locally unique. The number of equilibria is
almost always finite and must be odd. Finally the equilibrium
is globally unique if the price mapping functions are similar,
or the J(p) is in some sense negative definite on a certain set.
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VIII. APPENDIX
A. Global uniqueness of special networks
In this subsection, we prove conditions for global unique-
ness for special networks.
1) Case 1: linear link-independent mj: When the price
mapping functions are linear and link-independent, i.e.,
mjl (pl) = k
jpl for some scalars kj > 0, it is easy to
show that we have an unusual situation in the theory of
heterogeneous protocols where the equilibrium rate vector x
solves the following concave maximization problem
max
x
∑
i,j
kjU ji (x
j
i ) s. t. Rx ≤ c
Therefore, such a network always has a globally unique
equilibrium when U ji are strictly concave.
Here we provide another proof using Theorem 15.
Theorem 16. Suppose assumptions A1–A3 hold and R has
full row rank. If for all j and l, mjl (pl) = kjpl for some
scalars kj > 0, then there is a unique network equilibrium.
Proof. We prove this by showing that the Jacobian matrix
J(p) defined in (8) is negative definite over all p ≥ 0. Then
the result follows from Theorem 15.
Under the assumptions of the theorem, J(p) can be simpli-
fied into (from (8)–(10))
J(p) =
∑
j
RjDj(p)
(
Rj
)T ∂mj
∂p
(p)
=
∑
j
kjRjDj(p)
(
Rj
)T
where Dj(p) = ∂xj(p)/∂qj . Since U ji are strictly concave,
Dj(p) is a strictly negative diagonal matrix for all p ≥ 0.
Now, J(p) is symmetric. Moreover, since R has full row rank,
RRT is positive definite, i.e., for any nonzero vector v ∈ <L,∑
j
vTRj(Rj)T v =
∑
j
(
(Rj)T v
)T
(Rj)T v > 0
Then there exists at least one j such that ηj := (Rj)T v is
nonzero. Without lose of generality, assume it is j = 1. Then
vTJ(p)v = vT
∑
j
kjRjDj(p)(Rj)T v
=
∑
j
kj(ηj)TDj(p)ηj
≤ k1(η1)TD1(p)η1 < 0
where the first inequality follows from the fact that Dj(p) is
negative definite. Hence J(p) is negative definite.
2) Case 2: linear network: We now apply Theorem 6
to prove global uniqueness of linear networks. Consider the
classic linear network shown in Figure 7. There are L links
1x
L+1x
2x Lx
Fig. 7. Corollary 17: linear network.
and L+1 flows. Suppose without loss of generality that every
flow uses a different protocol. This implies that Dj(p) =
∂xj(p)/∂qj is a negative scalar under assumption A1. Denote
by ej a L× 1 vector with 1 in the jth entry and 0 elsewhere,
and 1 a L× 1 vector with 1 in every entry. Then Rj = ej for
j = 1 . . . L, and RL+1 = 1.
Theorem 17. Suppose assumptions A1–A2 hold. The linear
network in Figure 7 has a unique equilibrium.
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Proof. Take Λ = I in the gradient algorithm (19). We will
prove that all the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix
J(p) =
∑
j
RjDj(p)(Rj)T
∂mj(p)
∂p
have negative real parts for all p ≥ 0. This implies that all
equilibria are locally stable. By Theorem 6 there must be a
unique equilibrium.
In the network shown in Figure 7, for j = 1 . . . L,
(Rj)T
∂mj(p)
∂p
=
∂mjj(p)
∂pj
(ej)T
Since Dj(p) is a negative scalar, we can define a positive
number βj such that:
RjDj(p)(Rj)T
∂mj(p)
∂p
= −βjej · (ej)T
For j = L + 1, ∂mj(p)/∂p is a positive definite diagonal
matrix. Recall that Dj(p) is a scalar. Assume that the ith
diagonal entry of matrix Dj(p)∂mj(p)/∂p is −γi. Denote by
γ the L× 1 vectors formed from γi. Then for j = L+ 1:
RjDj(p)(Rj)T
∂mj(p)
∂p
= −1 · 1T diag(γi) = −1γT
By combining the results above, we obtain
J(p) =
L+1∑
j=1
RjDj(Rj)T
∂mj
∂p
= −
L∑
1
βje
j · (ej)T − 1γT
= −diag(βi)− 1γT
By the following Lemma, all the eigenvalues of above matrix
have negative real parts. Therefore, there must be a unique
equilibrium by Theorem 6.
Lemma 18. Suppose that B is a positive definite diagonal
matrix, and γ is a positive vector, then the eigenvalues of
B + 1γT have positive real parts.
Proof. Suppose that λ is an eigenvalue of B + 1γT , then
diag(βi − λ) + 1γT is singular. If λ = βi for certain i, then,
since βi > 0, λ is positive. Otherwise the following matrix is
also singular
I + diag
(
1
βi − λ
)
1γT (45)
The rank of matrix diag(1/(βi − λ))1γT is 1. Moreover it has
only one nonzero eigenvalue equal to
∑
i γi/(βi−λ). For the
matrix in (45) to be singular, it must have a zero eigenvalue,
and this is possible if and only if∑
i
γi
βi − λi = −1
The real part of γi/(βi − λi) is γi(βi −Reλ)/|βi − λ|2. If
Reλ ≤ 0, the sum of the real part of γi/(βi − λi) cannot be
−1. So we must have Reλ > 0.
Remark: The above result can be generalized to include more
than one multi-hop flows, provided they all belong to the same
type L+ 1 and the sets of links they traverse are nested, i.e.,
L(xL+11 ) ⊇ L(xL+12 ) ⊇ · · · ⊇ L(xL+1n ) for n multi-hop flows.
This result tells us the two 2-link flows in Example 3 are
necessary to demonstrate non-uniqueness.
3) Case 3: networks with no flow using more than 2 links:
Theorem 6 also implies the global uniqueness of equilibrium
for any network in which no flow passes through more than
2 links in the active constraint set, when A1–A3 hold. In this
case, the Jacobian matrix J(p) is strictly diagonally dominant
with negative diagonal entries, and hence its determinant is
(−1)L.
Theorem 19. Suppose assumptions A1–A2 hold and R has full
row rank. A network that has multiple equilibria must have at
least three links.
Proof. When there is only one link, the Jacobian matrix J(p)
reduces to a negative real number, since RjDj(p)(Rj)T is
negative, and ∂mj/∂p is positive. Therefore, any equilibrium
is locally stable. Hence it is unique by Theorem 6.
When there are two links, the Jacobian matrix at any p is
J(p) =
∑
j
RjDj(p)(Rj)T
∂mj(p)
∂p
It can be checked that JT (p) is diagonally dominant with
strictly negative diagonal entries. Moreover, the full rank
condition on R implies that there are sources (j, i) such
that Rj1iR
j
2i = 0, and hence JT (p) is strictly diagonally
dominant. This implies that JT (p) is negative definite with
strictly negative real eigenvalues. Since J(p) and JT (p) have
the same eigenvalues, J(p) and hence all equilibria are locally
stable. By Theorem 6, there is a unique equilibrium.
Remark: If R does not have full row rank, then there are
two-link networks that have multiple equilibria, as we now
illustrate.
B. Smallest network with multiple equilibria
Example 5: a two-link network with non-unique equilibria
In this example, we again assume that all sources use the
same utility function defined as
U ji (x
j
i ) = −
1
2
(
1− xji
)2
The network topology is shown in Figure 8 with link capacities
c = [1, 1]. The corresponding routing matrices for these two
protocols are
R1 = R2 =
[
1
1
]
We use linear price mapping functions mj(p) = Kjp, j =
1, 2, where Kj are 2× 2 matrices given by
K1 = I, K2 = diag(1, 3)
17
1x2
1x
1
Fig. 8. Example 5: a network with 2 links and 2 protocols.
As for Example 1, we check the matrix
2∑
i=1
Ri(Ri)TKi =
[
1 4
1 4
]
which has determinant 0, implying multiple equilibria. It is
easy to verify that the following points are all equilibria:
p1 = ², p2 = 1/4− ²/2, where ² ∈ [0, 1/2]
The corresponding rates are:
x11 = 3/4− ²/2, x21 = 1/4 + ²/2
The capacity constraints are all tight.
Remark: Note that even with a single protocol, the example
above has non-unique equilibrium price vectors since the
routing matrix is not full rank. However, in that case, the
equilibrium rates are unique, unlike the case of multiple
protocols.
